Abstract. Enterprise firewalls can be easily circumvented, e.g. by attack agents aboard infected mobile computers or telecommuters' computers, or by attackers exploiting rogue access points or modems. Techniques that prevent connection to enterprise networks of nodes whose configuration does not conform to enterprise policies could greatly reduce such vulnerabilities. Network Admission Control (NAC) and Network Access Protection (NAP) are recent industrial initiatives to achieve such policy enforcement. However, as currently specified, NAC and NAP assume that users are not malicious. We propose novel techniques using secure coprocessors to protect access to enterprise networks. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed techniques are effective against malicious users and have acceptable overhead.
Introduction
Enterprise networks' first line of defense typically consists of firewalls and virtual private network (VPN) gateways. System administrators usually attempt to install such nodes at every point of contact between an enterprise's intranet and the public Internet. However, the security perimeter thereby achieved can be rather leaky. Users can bring to their offices mobile computers infected while used on a trip. Telecommuters can use hacked computers to connect to the enterprise's VPN. Users often install in their offices wireless access points or modems, without consulting system administrators. Users may find such rogue network nodes or mobile computers convenient, but attackers can use them to circumvent the enterprise's firewalls.
These vulnerabilities could be prevented in an enterprise network that verifies that a node's configuration conforms to the enterprise's security policies before accepting connection of the node to the network. This type of network policy enforcement has not traditionally been available, but currently there are several initiatives to support it, including Cisco's Network Admission Control (NAC) [1] and Microsoft's Network Access Protection (NAP) [9] . In Microsoft's NAP, before connecting to an intranet, a host sends to a network-designated server a list of the host's software components and configuration. This list indicates, e.g., what operating system and anti-virus software are installed in the host and what version, security patches, and virus definitions they have. If the server finds that the host's software is up-to-date and acceptable, the server allows the host to connect to the intranet. Otherwise, the server confines the host to a restricted network. The restricted network allows the host's software to be updated and brought into compliance with intranet policies. Cisco's NAC architecture extends this concept to control the connection not only of hosts, but also access points and other devices. Networks and nodes that support such access control functionality are expected to become common in the next several years.
However, NAC and NAP provide only weak security. Software component and configuration lists can be easily forged or modified by a malicious user. Using a forged or modified list, an attacker can circumvent NAC and NAP and gain
The sender sends the content only if the sender deems the receiver's software as trustworthy. The receiver's software then seals the content so that it cannot be accessed by untrusted software. However, sealing can be used also for software lock-in [4] . An application, e.g. an editor, may seal to itself content created by the host owner. This can make it impossible for the host owner to switch to a different application or to access the data using a future host. In this sense, sealing can make a host unsafe. In Section 4.3, we propose sealing-free attestation confinement for securing network access without compromising host safety.
Experimental results in Section 5 show that our proposed mechanisms are effective and have acceptable overhead. We discuss related work in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
TPM functions
To secure access to enterprise networks, we use two main TPM functions: authenticated boot and attestation. We describe these functions in this section. Readers who are already familiar with TCG secure coprocessors may skip this section.
Authenticated boot presupposes that when a host is reset, control of the CPU is transferred to a small, trusted, immutable software component. In a personal computer, this component is the BIOS boot block. The OS's boot sequence is modified such that, before each software component A passes control to another software component B that has not yet been measured, A measures B's digest, appends the digest to a measurement log, and compresses the digest into the TPM. A obtains B's digest using SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) [11] . SHA-1 digests are 20 bytes long, regardless of data length. This algorithm has properties such that it is infeasible to modify B without also modifying its digest, or to find a B whose digest is an arbitrary value. The TPM compresses a digest into one of its registers by concatenating the register's value and the digest, computing SHA-1 on this concatenation, and storing the resulting value back into the register. The TPM's registers are initialized to zero on host reset. They can be read, but cannot be otherwise modified. TPM register values can be used to authenticate the measurement log, whose plaintext is stored in main memory.
Attestation is a protocol that enables a remote party R to obtain and authenticate a host P 's measurement log. R sends to P a nonce, i.e., a cryptographically random number that is never reused. P asks its TPM to sign a so-called quote, containing the nonce and current values of the TPM's registers. Presence of the nonce in the quote guarantees that a quote cannot be later replayed. The signature uses an attestation identity key (AIK). P sends the corresponding AIK certificate to R together with the quote and measurement log. TPMs generate private and public AIK pairs internally. TPMs use private AIKs only to sign quotes (as defined above), and never reveal such keys externally. The host owner obtains the AIK certificate from a so-called privacy certifying authority, which verifies that the host contains a properly attached TCG-compliant TPM. R authenticates the AIK certificate using the certifying authority's public key, which R is assumed to know out-of-band. R then uses the nonce and public AIK to authenticate the quote and uses the quote to authenticate the measurement log. The authenticated log reveals securely to R what software booted in P .
Network protocol enhancements
This section describes protocol enhancements for securing network access.
IEEE 802.1x [7] is a standard, widely supported protocol that can be configured to require mutual authentication between a node and a local area network (LAN) before the node is allowed to communicate through the network (beyond authentication). The participants to this protocol are the supplicant, i.e. the node that requests access, the authenticator, e.g. a switch or access point that mediates the supplicant's access to the network, and the authentication server, e.g. a RADIUS server that authenticates and authorizes the supplicant's access. A variety of authentication protocols can be used over 802.1x, including PEAPv2 [13] . PEAPv2 begins by creating a TLS tunnel between authentication server and supplicant, with certificate-based authentication of the former by the latter. The server then typically uses MS-CHAPv2 for password-based supplicant authentication. Finally, PEAPv2 binds the TLS and MS-CHAPv2 keys to guarantee that the respective endpoints are the same. 802.1x also enables the creation of a security association between authenticator and supplicant, with cryptographic keys for encrypting and authenticating packets sent between them. On Ethernet, such packet-level cryptography is being standardized by IEEE 802.1ae; on Wi-Fi, packet-level cryptography is enabled by IEEE 802.11i.
PEAPv2 authenticates only the supplicant's user. We propose to combine PEAPv2 with Bound Keyed Attestation (BKA). This combination enables the server to authenticate both the supplicant's host configuration and user before the server authorizes the supplicant's communication. If the server does not trust the supplicant's configuration, the server can deny access to the supplicant or confine the supplicant to a restricted virtual LAN (VLAN, as indicated, e.g., by a RADIUS access accept attribute).
Bound Keyed Attestation
This subsection shows that attestation, as defined by TCG, is vulnerable to MITM attacks. It then proposes BKA, a novel form of attestation that resists MITM attacks.
As shown in Fig. 1 , a malicious user can use two computers, one of which is conformant to network security policies, to get past TCG-defined attestation. The user hacks the intermediate computer such that it passes to the user's conformant computer any attestation requests, and passes the corresponding attestation replies back to the authentication server. The latter cannot discern the presence of a MITM, and therefore authorizes access, even though the MITM may have a configuration in complete violation of the network's security policies.
This vulnerability is not eliminated by securely tunneling attestation messages, e.g. using TLS. A secure tunnel can protect the confidentiality and integrity of the messages against third-party attacks. However, if the client is not . TCG-specified attestation is vulnerable to MITM attacks. If a malicious user has two computers, one of which is conformant to the server's policies, the user can employ the conformant computer to get a hacked computer accepted by the server. It makes no difference if TLS is used. trustworthy, the tunnel cannot prevent the latter from acting as a MITM that relays attestation or other messages between the tunnel and another computer.
To thwart this type of attack, we propose a novel form of attestation, Bound Keyed Attestation (BKA). It differs from TCG-specified attestation in two important ways. First, it derives new keys shared by the attestation endpoints. Second, it securely binds these keys to a tunnel's keys. This binding guarantees that tunnel and attestation endpoints are the same. Consequently, a MITM attack is not possible.
All BKA messages can be transmitted using a previously established secure tunnel T (e.g., PEAPv2's TLS tunnel) with which the attestation will be bound. It is assumed that T is cryptographically secured with a dynamically generated secret key K T that is not revealed to users. T can have states attested or not-attested (default). System policies can prevent communication other than for attestation while the tunnel is not-attested. Like a Diffie-Hellman key exchange [3] , BKA uses two publicly known numbers: a prime number q and an integer α that is a primitive root of q. These numbers do not need to change. As shown in Fig. 2 , the attestation initiator A picks two random numbers: a nonce N A , which is never reused, and another integer 0 ≤ X A < q, which may be reused. The initiator computes its public key Y A = α X A mod q. The initiator then sends to the attestation responder B a BKA request message M i containing q, α, Y A , and N A .
The responder then picks a random integer 0 ≤ X B < q, which may be reused, and computes its public key Y B = α X B mod q. The responder computes the attestation shared secret as K AB = Y X B A mod q, and its attestation binding B B = SHA1(N A |K T |K AB |Y A |"BKA response"), where | denotes concatenation. The responder also computes the initiator's attestation nonce n A = SHA1(N A |K AB ). The responder then gets from its TPM its quote Q B containing n A . Finally, the responder sends to the initiator a BKA response message M r containing Y B , a fresh nonce N B , B B , Q B , and B's measurement log L B and AIK certificate C B . Alternatively, if the responder also wishes to obtain the initiator's attestation, the responder sends to the initiator a BKA response-request message M rr containing the same fields as M r .
The initiator processes M r as follows. First, the initiator computes the attestation shared secret as K AB = Y X A B mod q. The initiator then computes the expected value of B B using K AB . If the received B B does not match this ex- pected value, the initiator sends a BKA error message to the responder and returns failure (possibly the tunnel and attestation endpoints are not the same, and a MITM attack is happening). Otherwise, the initiator authenticates C B using the respective certifying authority's public key (known securely out-of-band), authenticates the responder's quote Q B using n A and C B , and authenticates the responder's measurement log using Q B . If any of the authentications fails, or the initiator does not recognize a measurement in the responder's log L B as that of a trusted software component, the initiator sends a BKA error message to the responder and returns failure. Otherwise, the initiator computes its binding B A = SHA1(N B |K T |K AB |Y B |"BKA success"). The initiator then sends to the responder a BKA success message M s containing B A , transitions T 's state to attested, and returns success.
Processing of M rr by the initiator is similar to that of M r , except that (1) the initiator also computes the responder's attestation nonce n B = SHA1(N B |K AB ) and gets from the initiator's TPM its quote Q A containing n B , and (2) instead of M s , the initiator sends to the responder a BKA success-response message M sr containing B A , Q A , and A's measurement log L A and AIK certificate C A .
The responder processes M s by computing the expected value of B A and verifying that the received B A matches it. If so, the responder transitions T 's state to attested. Otherwise, T 's state remains not-attested. Processing of M sr is similar, except that, if the received B A matches its expected value, (1) the responder also authenticates C A , Q A , and L A , and (2) if all authentications succeed, and the responder identifies each measurement in the initiator's log as that of a trusted software component, then the responder transitions T 's state to attested; otherwise, T 's state remains not-attested.
Nonces N A and N B guarantee quote freshness and allow bound keyed attestations to be obtained frequently, without burdening the processors each time with the expensive computation of Y A , Y B , and K AB . Performance can be improved also by caching the authentication of C A and C B and the values of common intermediate expressions that change infrequently. The attestation nonces n x are one-way functions of not only the nonces N x but also the attestation shared key K AB . Therefore, the quotes are bound to the attestation shared key, which in turn is bound to the tunnel key K T by B x , where x ∈ {A, B}.
Operating system enhancements
As explained in the previous section, BKA requires hosts to have TPMs. However, use of TPMs poses several OS challenges. We propose in the following subsections three novel solutions to these challenges: TCB prelogging, security association root tripping, and sealing-free attestation confinement.
TCB prelogging
TCG documents specify that a system's BIOS, master boot record, boot loader, and OS kernel should be measured and their digests included in the system's measurement log. However, not only these components, but any member of the system's Trusted Computing Base (TCB) needs to be measured. A system's TCB is defined as the set of components whose malfunction (due, e.g., to a bug or attack) would allow the system's policies to be compromised. Therefore, the TCB includes not only the TCG-mentioned components, but also their configuration files and any privileged applications that could modify them, e.g. root-owned scripts or daemons and setuid applications. On the other hand, unprivileged user applications that are not part of the TCB can be created, configured, modified, or destroyed without compromising the system's ability to enforce policies.
We propose that each system maintain a configuration file listing the system's TCB components and respective digests. A bug in this TCB list (e.g., absence of a TCB component) could enable system policies to be violated. Therefore, the TCB list needs to include an entry for itself. By convention, the digest of the TCB list is calculated by making this entry's digest equal to zero, and the result is stored in this entry. At boot time, after the kernel mounts the file systems, the kernel appends the TCB list to the measurement log and compresses the list's digests into the TPM. Thereafter, whenever a file that is a TCB component, rootowned script or daemon or setuid application is opened or exec'ed, the kernel measures the file's digest. If this digest is different from the one last logged for the file, the kernel appends the new measurement to the log and compresses the new digest into the TPM. Thus, an authenticated measurement log will reveal whether a tampered or untrusted TCB component has run in the system since the system booted.
Security association root tripping
Unprivileged users cannot cause the OS kernel or daemons to compromise the system's policy enforcement. (If that is not true, the system has a bug that needs to be fixed.) However, privileged users (e.g., root) can easily violate the system's policy enforcement, e.g. by using commands such as sysctl or ifconfig or by using a debugger to attach and modify privileged processes, after boot time. It can be difficult or impossible to guarantee that all such configuration modifications are captured in the system's measurement log. Moreover, TCG does not specify what to do when such modifications occur.
We propose to modify the OS such that it detects and takes appropriate action when a privileged user attempts to gain interactive access to the system (e.g. by logging in or using the su command). If there are any attestation-based security associations, the system warns the user that, if the user wants to continue, the system will immediately drop those security associations. Thus, in the case of secure intranet access, the system will destroy the keys used for packetlevel cryptography, making access impossible. Furthermore, if the user wants to continue, the system appends this event to the measurement log with a wellknown digest and compresses the latter into the TPM. Therefore, subsequent attestations will show that a privileged user has logged in interactively. System administrators can configure authentication servers to deny access to such supplicants, who will need to reboot before again gaining access to the network (reboot erases the measurement log, as well as any non-persistent configuration changes; persistent changes are captured by the new measurement log after reboot). These mechanisms do not preclude remote system administration or help, as long as these are performed using daemons that the network's authentication server is configured to trust.
Sealing-free attestation confinement
TPMs include a function, sealing, that can be abused by applications. As discussed in the Introduction, sealing enables software lock-in, making hosts unsafe.
To enable BKA without compromising safety, we propose that the OS (1) support authenticated boot and attestation, but not sealing, and (2) allow attestation only in conjunction with network access control protocols (such as 802.1x and IPsec's IKE). Abusive applications then cannot encrypt and bind to themselves file contents, as necessary for software lock-in. When the host is disconnected, the contents would need to be sealed, but the OS does not provide this service. On the other hand, when the host is Internet-connected, abusive applications, instead of sealing, could attempt to store file encryption keys in a remote server that reveals the keys only to abusive applications in attested clients. However, the OS allows attestation only in conjunction with protocols that typically cannot go through enterprise firewalls. Because the OS confines attestation to the intranet, it thwarts software lock-in also in this case. 
Experimental evaluation
This section evaluates the performance impact of the proposed mechanisms.
Reported results are averages of six measurements. We implemented the proposed OS enhancements on FreeBSD 4.8 and installed this OS on an IBM ThinkPad T30 computer with 1.8 GHz Pentium 4 CPU, 256 MB RAM, TPM version 1.1b, TPM-aware BIOS, and built-in 802.11b interface. The master boot record and GRUB were modified for measuring digests and compressing them into the TPM as specified by TCG. We measured a total boot time of 20.08 s (σ = 0.12) before and 20.15 s (σ = 0.17) after our modifications. Although TCB prelogging and file digest measuring impose overheads, they are completely dominated by other boot costs. During system operation, each file digest measurement can be cached, and need not be repeated while the file is not modified [15] . Because TCB components change infrequently, file digest measurements can be expected to have little impact on steady-state performance. Security association root tripping affects only certain commands (e.g., login and su) and only when used by privileged users. Therefore, it also has negligible performance impact, as does sealing-free attestation confinement.
We integrated PEAPv2/802.1x with BKA on the FreeRADIUS authentication server [5] and Open1x supplicant [12] . In order to estimate a comparison with NAP, we alternatively integrated PEAPv2/802.1x with a NAP-like LOG protocol. Both in BKA and in LOG, the supplicant sends its list of software components and configuration to the authentication server, who may approve it or not. However, unlike BKA's list, LOG's list can be forged by the supplicant. We installed FreeRADIUS on a Dell Dimension 4550 computer with 2.4 GHz Pentium 4 CPU, 256 MB RAM, and unmodified FreeBSD 4.10. We installed Open1x on the aforementioned IBM T30 computer. As authenticator, we used a Cisco Aironet 1100 802.11b access point connected to the authentication server via Fast Ethernet. We used BKA with precomputed modulus (1024-bit) and primitive root. Table 1 shows that the time it takes for the supplicant to connect to the network increased from about 67 ms to 88 ms with LOG or 2.8 s with BKA. To understand the source of BKA's large overhead, we measured the time it takes for the supplicant to obtain a quote from its TPM, and found it to be 2.5 s (σ = 0.2). Therefore, most of the latency added by BKA is due to the TPM. However, even with a low-cost, slow TPM, such as the one we used, the connection latency is acceptable.
In order to evaluate the impact of LOG or BKA on the CPU utilization of the authentication server, we instrumented the OS's idle loop and interrupt vector. The instrumented OS uses the CPU's built-in cycle counter to measure CPU idle time, excluding interrupts. We also instrumented FreeRADIUS to measure the total time necessary to authenticate and authorize supplicant access. Table 1 shows how long the authentication server's CPU was busy while processing a single supplicant, and the projected throughput (load for saturating the CPU). LOG and BKA reduced projected throughput from roughly 2650 to 2510 or 519 supplicants/minute, respectively. BKA's large overhead is due to its use of publickey algorithms for key exchange and authentication of certificates and quotes, as well as repeated applications of SHA-1. Although BKA's overhead is substantial, the projected throughput may be acceptable for medium-size networks. Note that, in our scheme, a supplicant imposes no load on the authentication server after the latter authorizes access. In larger networks, load can be distributed simply by using multiple low-cost authentication servers, such as the one we used.
Related work
NAC [1] and NAP [9] are the architectures most closely related to our work. Because NAP uses DHCP for controlling access to enterprise LANs, malicious users can circumvent it simply by using a static networking configuration. We use 802.1x instead of DHCP to avoid this security loophole. NAC is currently implemented on certain routers, using a proprietary access control protocol. Unlike our solution, such an implementation does not prevent unauthorized access to LANs that a malicious user might directly connect to.
Our TCB lists are similar to what Tripwire [17] uses to verify host integrity. However, unlike Tripwire, we enable administrators to verify host integrity remotely. Bear [8] is a Linux-based OS that supports TPMs and uses similar lists, signed by trusted system administrators. Bear's Enforcer verifies at load time whether a file's digest matches its value on the signed list. In case of a mismatch, Enforcer takes the action specified on the list (e.g., return failure). Bear does not support attestation, relying instead on certificates with special semantics, and has no protection against privileged users. Security association root tripping (Section 4.2) would significantly improve Bear's security.
TcgLinux [15] is another OS with TPM support. Because tcgLinux does not have a TCB list, it logs and compresses into the TPM digests of all files that are executed, and requires shells and other programs to be modified to do the same with their security-sensitive scripts and configuration files. This design makes it harder to verify that all TCB configuration files are being measured. It also unnecessarily exposes in attestations the execution of unprivileged programs, reducing user privacy. TcgLinux has mechanisms to prevent privileged users from making system modifications that might not be detected by attestation. It does allow, however, any modifications that would be detected by attestation. TcgLinux attestations have been used to secure VPN access [16] . However, that solution has several shortcomings. First, TCG-specified attestation is vulnerable to MITM attacks, as shown in Section 3.1. Second, tcgLinux would be vulnerable to MITM attacks even if BKA were used, because it does not prevent privileged users from reading secret keys and other parameters of VPN tunnels. In contrast, security association root tripping would close the VPN tunnels before such reading would be possible. Third, the VPN gateway has to verify fresh attestations of each client frequently. If attestation frequency is low, users may be able to connect an insecure node to the VPN long enough to cause harm. On the other hand, our experimental results suggest that high attestation frequencies could severely limit the throughput of the VPN gateway. In contrast, security association root tripping achieves security with a single attestation at the beginning of each client's session.
Microsoft's NGSCB architecture [10] uses TPMs and divides the system into trusted and untrusted halves. The untrusted half runs a conventional OS, including file system and network protocol stack. On the other hand, the trusted half secures user credentials and keys for digital rights management. It uses storage and communication services provided by the untrusted half. NGSCB requires special CPUs with Intel's LaGrande Technology (LT). Terra [6] is an OS with similar architecture, but uses a virtual machine monitor instead of LT. It is unclear how NGSCB or Terra would be used for securing network access, because those systems cannot guarantee the integrity of the untrusted half's configuration.
Conclusions
Firewall-based network security perimeters can be leaky. Architectures such as NAC and NAP attempt to plug perimeter leaks by preventing nodes that do not conform to a network's security policies from joining the network. However, those architectures are vulnerable to malicious users. TCG has specified inexpensive secure coprocessors that could harden those architectures. However, several challenges need to be overcome, including how to prevent MITM attacks, undetected changes to system files, tampering by privileged users, and software lock-in. We proposed novel solutions to these challenges: bound keyed attestation, TCB prelogging, security association root tripping, and sealing-free attestation confinement. We integrated these mechanisms with FreeBSD and PEAP over 802.1x. Experimental results show that our techniques allow secure coprocessors to protect access to enterprise networks robustly, safely, and with acceptable overhead.
